I. INTRODUCTION
Venture capital 1 contracts are heterogeneous: there exist differences across contracts in the selected securities, control rights, veto rights, provisions for different contingencies, among other things, depending on the characteristics of the transacting parties. Venture capital exit decisions are also heterogeneous: a disposition may involve an initial public offering (IPO), or an acquisition (i.e., a trade sale, where both the entrepreneur and venture capitalist sell their interest), and venture capital contracts typically specify which party has control over the exit decision. 2 It is widely recognized that a venture capitalist's decision to invest in an entrepreneurial firm is based on exit potential. While previous research in venture capital has identified international differences in financial contracts and international differences in exit strategies, the precise interaction between these two activities has not been empirically studied. This paper introduces a new European venture capital dataset to provide new insights into the ways in which contracting and exit are interrelated. This paper provides a positive empirical analysis of the types of contracts used by venture capitalists, and a normative empirical analysis of the resulting exit process associated with different contracts and different types of entrepreneurial investments.
In the first of the two main parts of this paper, a positive analysis of functional differences in financial contracts is provided. We expand the scope of evidence on securities used in venture capital finance. While venture capitalists in the United States almost always use convertible preferred equity to finance entrepreneurial firms, venture capitalists in every other country (at least those where data are available) use a variety of forms of finance (see section II below for details). In the European venture capital data herein, we observe common equity used most frequently, but there are a wide variety of securities used in venture capital transactions. We relate the use of different securities to the type of entrepreneurial firm (e.g., stage of development, industry), board seats, specific contingencies, veto rights and other control rights. Previous research has not considered the allocation of control rights when securities other than convertible preferred equity are used.
The second of the two main parts of this paper provides a normative analysis of the performance of the different investments -in terms of the selected exit vehicle (IPO, acquisition, write-off 3 ) and the IRR. This part of the analysis is based on previous research on venture capital exits (MacIntosh, 1997; Black and Gilson, 1998; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Schweinbacher, 2001; Smith, 2001; Fleming, 2002) . We extend previous research by considering, among other things, how control rights and cash flow rights among different securities affects the selection of the exit vehicle. Our data are the first European dataset that enables and investmentby-investment analysis of the selected exit vehicle, 4 and the first dataset (anywhere) that enables a normative analysis of which financial structure is 'best' in venture capital finance.
This paper analyzes a hand-collected dataset involving 179 investment rounds in 132 entrepreneurial firms from 17 European venture capital funds. Coincidentally, the data are quite similar in scope to other hand-collected datasets in academic venture capital research. For example, Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) analyze 213 investment rounds in 119 portfolio companies by 14 U.S. venture capital funds. Papers by Gompers (1997) and Puri (2000, 2001) also use data of similar scope.
In a nutshell, the data herein indicate the following. First, different securities are not functional equivalents in venture capital contracts. That contracts other than convertible preferred equity are used is not dependent on the definition of venture capital. Second, the allocation of control rights, board seats, etc., depends on the allocation of cash flow rights through the use of different securities. Third, the selected exit vehicle and the returns to venture capital significantly depend on the allocation of cash flow and control rights in specific venture capitalist investments. The results are interpreted within the institutional context from which the data are derived, and suggest avenues for further theoretical and empirical research.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines previous research. The data are described in section III. Section IV considers the determinants of contractual terms. Section V evaluates the performance of the investments under different contracts, and the likelihood of different exit outcomes. Limitations are discussed in section VI, and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research are discussed. Concluding remarks follow.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Our research is based on a number of earlier papers that have provided the foundation for understanding venture capital (VC) investing and exit decisions. Previous VC contracting and exit papers may be categorized into seven groups: 5 (1) Empirical research based on U.S. data indicating the prevalent use of convertible preferred equity, staging, syndication, and various control rights, etc. (Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995 Gompers, , 1997 Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002) ; (2) Theoretical research explaining the optimality of convertible preferred equity in venture capital based on the U.S. evidence, and the allocation of various control rights (Sahlman, 1990; Chan, et al., 1990; Berglöf, 1994; Cornelli and Yosha, 1997; Hellmann, 1998; Marx, 1998; Trester, 1998; Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Repullo and Suarez, 1998; Bascha and Walz, 2001a; Kirilenko, 2001; Schmidt, 2001 ; among others); (3) Research indicating the role of U.S. tax law in biasing the selected security in the U.S. towards convertible preferred equity for U.S. entrepreneurial firms (Gilson and Schizer, 2001 ), but not in other jurisdictions such as Canada (Sandler, 2001) ; (4) Empirical research showing the use of a variety of different securities in jurisdictions other than the United States, including Canada (Cumming, 2000) , Germany (Bascha and Walz, 2001b) , Finland (Parhankangas and Smith, 2000) , Taiwan (Songtao, 2000) , Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2000) , as well as in cases of crossborder U.S. VC investments in Canadian entrepreneurial firms (Cumming, 2001) , and for different types of venture capital funds (not only limited partnerships, but also corporate VCs, government VCs, etc.; Cumming, 2000) ; 6 (5) Theoretical research on the optimality of convertible preferred equity in ensuring an efficient exit (Berglöf, 1994; Black and Gilson, 1998; Bascha and Walz, 2001; Hellmann, 2001; Smith, 2001; Schweinbacher, 2001 ); (6) Empirical research examining the performance of venture-backed IPOs (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991, Lin and Smith, 1997; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Ljungqvist, 1999; Franzke, 2001 ; among others);
(7) Empirical research examining the complete choice of different venture capital exit vehicles (IPOs, acquisitions, secondary sales, buybacks, and write-offs) based on the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firms and venture capital funds (MacIntosh, 1997; Black and Gilson, 1998; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Flemming, 2002) , and related empirical research explaining the risk and return to venture capital (Cochrane, 2001; Smith and Smith, 2000; Manignart et al., 2000) .
Previous venture capital research has not considered the allocation of control rights when securities other than convertible preferred equity are employed. In addition, previous research has not fully analyzed which types of investments and contracts typically lead to 'superior' results, in terms of the selected exit vehicle as well as the internal rate of return (IRR). The following sections provide an analysis of a new dataset that shed light on these issues, and suggest avenues for further research.
III. DATA A. Description of the Data
We consider the contracts and exits from a hand-collected sample of 17 European venture capital funds. The data comprise 179 investment rounds in 132 entrepreneurial firms (portfolio size ranges from 2 -20 entrepreneurial firms per fund). The VC funds are based in Austria (1 fund), Belgium (1), Czech Republic (1), Denmark (1), France (1), Germany (4), Italy (2), Poland
(1), Switzerland (1) and The Netherlands (4) . As with U.S.-based research with data of similar scope (Gompers, 1997; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002) , as well as European research (Maginart et al., 2000; , the funds were selected based on their willingness to disclose very detailed confidential information about their contracts and exits. We interpret the results from this sample of funds within the institutional context.
Thirty-three actual exits and 38 expected exits are observed in the data: 10 actual IPOs;
13 actual acquisitions; 10 actual write-offs; 12 expected IPOs; 25 expected acquisitions; and 1 expected write-down of the book value of an investment (which is analogous to a partial writeoff; see Cumming and MacIntosh, 2002) . The data do not appear to be driven towards the most successful or 'best' investments. The frequency of dispositions is similar to related papers on VC exits (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Cochrane, 2001; . That most of the investments (99 of the 132) have not been exited indicates that the data are based on recent transactions as from the date of data collection (November 2001 -February 2002 . This is not surprising, given the data collection was facilitated via the use of surveys and numerous interviews with VC fund managers.
For reasons of confidentiality, the data are not presented by individual venture capital fund. Nevertheless, the results are not attributable to the presence of any fund, group of funds, and/or type of fund in the data. For example, most every fund in the sample uses a variety of forms of finance (there were two exceptions: 1 fund used mostly convertible preferred equity, and one fund used mostly common equity). As well, most of the regression analyses below incorporate fixed effect VC fund dummy variables. Note that an alternative (and nearly equivalent) specification for the regressions in each of the tables is with location dummy variables (i.e., institutional and legal differences across the countries in the data). These regressions yielded nearly identical results (and are available upon request). In addition, note that the presence of buyout investments in the data does not materially change any of the main results (the tables without buyouts are available upon request).
The data on the types of contracts selected are summarized in Tables 1a -1f . The data are presented by entrepreneurial firm (with the one exception in Table 1a , where the number of financing rounds are reported in column 4). The types of securities used are broken down into four main categories: common equity, convertible preferred equity, mixes of common and preferred equity, and mixes of debt with common equity. As well, the (rare) cases in which syndicated VCs used different financing instruments are reported (see Schindele, 2002 , for a theoretical analysis). Consistent with research from outside the U.S. -see Bascha and Walz (2001) , Cumming (2000) , Smith and Parhankangas (2001) , Songtao (2001) , etc. -common equity is used most frequently by venture capitalists, but a variety of forms of finance are observed.
[ Tables 1a -1f About Here] Table 1a summarizes the data by the number of cases in which the respondent VC fund was the lead investor, the number of syndicated investments and financing rounds, and the number of VC board seats. We do not observe many financing rounds, nor do we observe significant variation among the financing rounds in this dataset (see Gompers, 1997, and Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002 , for greater variation across financing rounds in the U.S.). All the data and regressions in this paper are therefore presented by the 132 entrepreneurial firms, and not by the 179 investment rounds. Table 1c relates the selected forms of finance to exits (both actual and expected). The relations between these variables are considered in more detail in the subsequent sections.
Tables 1d -1f report the data relating the securities to the specific contractual contingencies (see Appendix A for examples), veto rights and various control rights (see Appendix B for examples). Categories of particular contractual contingencies are based on those reported by Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) in the U.S., as similar contingencies are found in the European VC data: financial, non-financial, certain actions, and sale of equity (see Appendix A).
The European data distinguish between contingencies designed to for motivate the entrepreneur from contingencies designed to motivate the venture capitalist or syndicated investors. Table 2a indicates the frequency of exits by firm characteristics, and Table 2b indicates the frequency of exits by control rights. Average IRRs are slightly higher for actual acquisitions than actual IPOs (and the reverse is true for expected exits), but these differences in means are not statistically significant (t-statistics for differences in average IRRs for actual and expected IPOs and acquisitions were less than 1.0).
[ Tables 2a and 2b About Here]
An interesting feature of the data is the presence of a greater number of reported expected acquisitions. Many VC fund managers did not expect the IPO market to be 'strong enough' over the coming months, up to year 2004. 'Preplanned' was given as the primary reason for exit in most cases (46). There were also 4 unsolicited offers, 12 exits for reasons of market conditions, 7
internal conflicts giving rise to write-offs, 2 exits for fundraising reasons, and 1 exit inspired by fund termination. The respondent VC controlled the exit in most (52) cases. Conflicts regarding the exit process were rare: 8 surrounded the timing of the exit, and 1 was regarding valuation. It is noteworthy, however, that 5 of the 10 actual IPOs involved a conflict about the timing of the exit, and 1 actual IPO involved a conflict about the valuation.
B. Are Different Securities in VC Contracts Functionally Equivalent? Univariate Tests
Theoretical research has offered many explanations for the financial structure of U.S.
VC-backed entrepreneurial firms: U.S. VCs finance U.S. entrepreneurial firms with the use of convertible preferred equity. As explained by Gilson and Schizer (2002) (Cumming, 2002) . Gilson and Schizer (2002) explain that the prevalent use of convertible preferred equity for U.S. venture backed firms is primarily related to the fact that U.S.
tax practice enables more favorable entrepreneurial incentive compensation.
If U.S. tax law colors the selected form of finance for venture-backed firms in the U.S., then it is important to test financial contracting theories using data from entrepreneurial firms in countries other than the U.S. for at least three reasons. First, with U.S. data, it is not directly possible to ascertain whether convertible preferred equity is optimal in the absence of a tax bias favoring the use of such securities. Second, it is not possible to test the relationship between different forms of finance and various control rights if tax laws exogenously determine the selected security. Third, it is not possible to ascertain whether the use of different securities is related to differences in exit strategies. Table 3a summarizes the data by providing statistical tests for the significance of the correlation coefficients between the securities and various other variables (actually, the reported significance test is the Chi-squared for the cross-tabulations; see Greene, 1998, p.245) .
[ Table 3a About Here] Importantly, Table 3a indicates that the use of specific contingencies is complementary to the financing instrument. 9 Contingencies are statistically more likely to be used for both the VC and the entrepreneur when convertible preferred equity is the selected financing instrument.
When common equity is selected, contingencies are statistically less likely to be employed.
When mixes of debt and common equity are used, or mixes of preferred equity and common equity are used, there is no statistical relationship to the use of specific contingencies.
The use of veto rights is statistically negatively related to the use of common equity, and statistically positively related to the use of convertible preferred equity. Veto rights are also statistically positively related to mixes of preferred and common, but statistically independent of debt and common equity.
Similar to the relation between veto rights and security choice is the relation between other control rights and security choice. VCs typically have fewer control rights with common equity, and more control rights when mixes of preferred and common are used. When convertible preferred equity is used, VCs are less likely to have the right to replace the CEO and have redemption rights, but more likely to have information rights and the right of first refusal in sale of the firm as well as protection rights against new issues. Most of the specific control rights are independent of the security choice when mixes of debt and common equity are used.
VCs obtain statistically smaller ownership percentages when convertible preferred equity is the selected financing instrument, and statistically greater ownership percentages when mixes of preferred and common are used. The univariate tests reveal no statistical relation between ownership percentage and the use of common equity or mixes of debt and common equity.
VCs are statistically more likely to obtain a majority of the board seats when mixes of debt and common equity are used. Obtaining a majority of the board is unrelated to the other types of securities in the univariate tests.
Convertible preferred equity is more likely to be used with seed and early stage investments, and with firms in the Internet/communications sectors. Common equity is used more often for expansion stage investments and firms in the medical/biotech industries.
In sum, different securities are functionally distinct. Specific contractual terms are not used so that different securities may mimic one another. That is, the specific terms appear to be complements with the security choice. Why? Many VCs indicated that the particular deals with simple payoff structures (common equity) are typically associated with few contractual provisions (such as veto rights and other specific control rights) because the important distinguishing aspect of the deal is in its simplicity. Lead investors often 'shy away' from complicated structures that do not facilitate room for negotiation with potentially new syndicated outside investors (see Lerner, 1994 , on the relation between lead and follow-on investors).
Moreover, entrepreneurs are often dissuaded by excessively complicated financing arrangements (see Black and Gilson, 1998 , on 'implicit' contracts in venture capital, and subsection III.C below). Low IRRs have in some cases been attributed to excessively complicated deal structures.
C. Are Different Contracts Related to Different Exit Vehicles? Univariate Tests
Similar to Table 3a, Table 3b summarizes the data by providing statistical tests for the significance of the correlation coefficients between the different exit vehicles and various other variables (as mentioned above, the reported significance test is the Chi-squared for the crosstabulations; see Greene, 1998, p.245) .
[ Table 3b About Here] Table 3b indicates two main findings. First, the use of common equity is more often related to IPO exits, and less often to acquisitions. Second, the use of specific control rights and veto rights (which are related to convertibles; see Table 3a ) are more often associated with acquisition exits, not IPOs. This supports Black and Gilson's (1998) implicit contracting theory.
Black and Gilson argue that there is often an implicit contract between VCs and entrepreneurs to transfer control back to the entrepreneur upon an IPO exit (which is in the interest of the entrepreneur). IPOs are observed with greater frequency when there are not many explicit covenants in the form of veto rights and control rights. In contrast, when many explicit covenants are used, acquisitions are the more common outcome.
In the subsections below, we consider in a multivariate framework the allocation of various control rights and choice of security (section IV). We also consider the likelihood of different exits based on the type of firm and type of contract in a multivariate setting (section V).
IV. WHAT DETERMINES THE SECURITY, VC OWNERSHIP %, BOARD SEATS, VETO & CONTROL RIGHTS? MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

A. Sequence of Decisions
Interviews with many European venture capital fund managers indicated the following typical sequence of events in designing venture capital contracts. First, the required rate of return is determined to make the investment worthwhile (depending on firm characteristicstechnology, development stage, etc.). This involves selecting a security that will provide the payoff to fit with the risk and required return. It is noteworthy that VC funds typically do not care about the downside. Similarly, Gilson and Schizer (2002) note that VCs rarely care about bankruptcy proceedings because the few assets remaining in a bankrupt VC investment are typically absent of any meaningful value. Second, ownership percentages and board seats are allocated, subject to the selected security. Third, over a negotiation period (typically a few months, and longer in poor economic conditions), specific control rights are allocated depending on the ownership structure and security to make sure both parties are 'happy' and the deal proceeds forward.
The multivariate regression equations below are based on this sequence of decisions. An issue that arises is in the joint determination of some of the variables in the various tables (but the main results are robust to alternative specifications; alternatives are available upon request). of using a constant without fixed effects. In all regressions, White's HCCME is used.
[ Table 4 About Here]
B. What Determines the Selected Security?
Cumming (2000) (with Canadian VC data) and Bascha and Walz (2001) (with German VC data) have considered determinants of the form of finance based on the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm receiving financing. Our analysis is similar. Table 5 provides binomial logit (Table 5a ) and multinomial logit (Theil, 1969) (Table 5b ) regressions of the determinants of the selected security based on the development stage of the entrepreneurial firm (late, turnaround and buyout stages are suppressed to avoid collinerity problems), the amount invested (book value), whether the VC was the lead investor, the number of syndicated partners, whether there was a preplanned IPO or acquisition, and the industry in which the entrepreneurial firm operates (medical/biotech, electronics/computer, and communications/Internet 10 ).
[ Tables 5a and 5b About Here]
The binomial and multinomial logit specifications yield quite robust results. The coefficients for the seed, early and expansion dummy variables indicate that convertible preferred equity securities are most likely. This is consistent with most academic venture capital research indicating convertible preferred equity is the optimal security (see, e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Cornelli and Yosha, 1997; Gompers, 1997; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002 There are other characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm, as well as characteristics of the investor(s) that may affect the selected form of finance. However, in the multinomial logit setting, the variables other than the stage of development variables are generally insignificant (see Cumming, 2000, and Bascha and Walz, 2001 , for contrasting evidence).
The predictive power of the regression models is indicated at the bottom of the tables.
The match between actual and predicted outcomes is fairly strong, but not perfect. Other lessvisible factors may play a role (e.g., a behavioral finance type variable such as 'a need for simplicity', and other entrepreneur firm variables could be used, based on interviews with VCs). There is evidence that larger VC investments increase VC ownership %, as would be expected (see, e.g., Noe and Rebello, 1996, Propositions 3 and 4) , but this result is only significant in model 2. Similarly, the greater the number of syndicated investors, the smaller the equity ownership of each VC (model 1 and 4).
C. What Determines VC Ownership Percentage and the Percentage of VC Board Seats?
Contracts with contingent equity allocations are complementary to the security: they are used with convertible preferred equity (model 3). Larger VC equity ownership % is associated with contracts involving mixes of debt and common equity (models 4 and 5).
VCs take a majority ownership % when they are preplanning an acquisition exit (model 1). This is consistent with Black and Gilson (1998) . Black and Gilson argue that entrepreneurs prefer IPO exits insofar as the entrepreneurial team regains control over the firm upon an IPO exit (acquisitions transfer control to the acquiror).
Industry dummy variables indicate tech entrepreneurial firms -particularly those in the
Internet/communications industries -are less likely to involve majority VC equity ownership (models 1 and 2).
Similar to Table 6 , Table 7 presents 5 regressions for the determinants of VC board seats.
The results are quite consistent with those in Table 6 .
[ Table 7 About Here]
VCs typically do not take a majority of the board for seed, early and expansion stage investments. However, the greater the VC ownership %, the VC will take a larger % of the board seats, and will more often control the board.
As with contingent equity ownership %, contracts involving contingent board seats in cases of poor performance are used for expansion stage investments, but not seed and early stage investments. Again, as with contingent equity ownership %, contingent board seats complement the security: convertible preferred equity, not common equity or mixes of debt and common equity. It is also noteworthy that VCs typically take fewer board seats when convertible preferred equity is used.
The evidence indicates that for investments in which exit is preplanned (both preplanned IPOs and preplanned acquisitions), VCs take relatively fewer board seats. While this may be somewhat surprising, as discussed below, VCs can control the exit decision in other ways (i.e., independently allocate control over exit).
Investments in high-tech industries also appear to typically involve fewer VC board seats.
We may have expected greater VC board representation among firms in industries where assets are typically intangible and more monitoring is required. Nevertheless, contingent VC board seats are more likely for the high-tech firms (at least those in the biotech/medical industries). Table 8 presents logit regressions for the determinants of contractual contingencies that are designed to provide effort incentives to the entrepreneur and/or the venture capitalist (specific contractual terms not directly part of the financing instrument; see Appendix A).
D. What Determines the use of Contractual Contingencies?
[ Table 8 About Here]
Interestingly, VCs are less likely to use self-motivating contractual terms when they act in the capacity of lead investor. Based on conversations with venture capitalists, the reason is simple: it is more difficult to develop syndication relationships with outside investors when such clauses are part of the lead investor's contract with the entrepreneur.
When VCs take a majority stake in the firm, incentive clauses are used significantly less frequently. Similarly, there is some evidence that incentive clauses for the entrepreneur are less likely (specifically clauses pertaining to non-financial performance and certain actions) when the VC provides more capital.
Consistent with contingent board seat allocation (see subsection IV.C.), the use of specific contingent incentive clauses for both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs appears to be complementary with the particular security: they are used more frequently with convertible preferred equity, and less frequently with common equity. As discussed in section III, this is further evidence that different securities are not functionally equivalent.
Contingent clauses for entrepreneurs are used more frequently in medical/biotech industries. Interviews with VC fund managers revealed that entrepreneurs in the industries are necessarily provided with specific incentives to obtain patents, and achieve other milestones.
Finally, the evidence indicates preplanned exits involve contingencies for both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist so that both have incentives to ensure that exit objectives are fulfilled. Table 9 presents logit estimates for the determinants of veto rights over asset sales, asset purchases, changes in control and other decisions.
E. When Do VCs Use Veto Rights?
[ Table 9 About Here]
Veto rights are most often used in the seed stage of development, and are less common in the early and expansion stages. This reflects the difficulty that venture capitalists face in terms of widely recognized agency problems, such as risk shifting, etc., among very young firms where the direction of the firm is highly variable. Lead investors are also more likely to use veto rights.
As with the evidence in the previous subsections, the use of veto rights is complementary to the security choice. Veto rights are more common with convertible securities. Therefore, for example, while convertibles mitigate risk-shifting agency problems (Green, 1984) , they are used in conjunction with veto rights. Veto rights are less likely to be used with other securities.
Similarly, when the VC has board control, veto rights are more likely for decisions over asset sales. This further supports the view that contractual terms are complementary, and not substitutes.
In this sample, veto rights are more frequently used in biotech/medical and computer/electronics industries.
F. How Are Control Rights Allocated when Capital Structure is Flexible?
Logit regressions for the determinants of specific control rights (see Appendix B for examples) are presented in Table 10 .
[ Table 10 About Here]
Accounting for other firm characteristics (discussed below), the early development stage firms (seed, early and expansion stages) are statistically less likely to be financed under most of these control rights.
Lead investors typically require most of the control rights (with the exception of automatic conversion upon IPO).
VC funds that hold a majority of the board seats also hold a specific contractual right to replace the CEO. Common equity contracts typically involve few specific control rights. Both of these results provide further support for the view that VC contractual terms are complementary.
Convertible preferred equity contracts typically also involve the right of first refusal in sale, as well as demand registration rights and piggyback registration rights. Consistent with Berglöf (1994) , this indicates that convertible preferred equity mitigates trilateral bargaining problems associated with the sale of the firm, 13 and the particular associated contractual terms to mitigate this trilateral bargaining problem are complements with the selected security.
Convertible preferred equity is not statistically related to the use of other control rights.
Control rights are more common among medical/biotech and computer/electronic firms than Internet/communications firms in the sample.
Interestingly, control rights are used much more frequently when there is a preplanned acquisition as opposed to a preplanned IPO. Consistent with Black and Gilson (1998) , entrepreneurs typically prefer IPO exits so that they may regain control over the firm upon VC exit. When acquisitions are planned, VCs typically put in place a greater number of contractual mechanisms to effect an acquisition exit.
The following section considers the normative implications of financing different entrepreneurial firms with different contracts.
V. HOW WELL DO INVESTMENTS PERFORM UNDER ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTS? MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
In the preceding section we presented statistics and regressions for determinants of contract choice. In this section our attention is focused on the implications associated with the use of different contractual terms. Two questions arise. First, how is the exit vehicle affected by the specific contractual terms, controlling for other firm characteristics? Second, do different contracts affect IRRs given the other firm characteristics?
We caution that only 33 of the 132 portfolio companies in the sample have been exited.
The actual exits span the period from 1997 -2001. We control for exits for reasons of 'market conditions'. There are also 38 expected exits, up to year 2004. While many statistically significant results are obtainable from the sample, the data also suggest avenues for further normative research. . Fixed effect dummies are used to control for differences between actual and expected exits in some of the specifications to illustrate robustness. Degrees of freedom do not permit inclusion of every specific contractual clause in the regressions; therefore, variables that aggregate the number of contingencies (subsection IV.D; Appendix A), veto rights (subsection IV.E), and control rights (subsection IV.F; Appendix B) are employed.
A. Choice of Exit Vehicle
[ Table 11 About Here]
The evidence indicates that IPOs are more likely when common equity is used, and when there are a greater number of incentive contingencies in contracts. 15 There has been theoretical research connecting convertible securities to exit strategies (e.g., Berglöf, 1994; Bascha and Walz, 2001; Hellmann, 2001) . Because VCs outside the U.S. most often use forms of finance other than convertible preferred equity (or functional equivalents), future theoretical research relating alternative forms of finance and specific contractual clauses to the exit strategy would be fruitful. Because the evidence herein is suggestive that specific control and veto rights with convertibles securities are less frequently associated with IPOs, it is supportive of Black and Gilson's (1998) implicit contracting theory of control transfer back to entrepreneurs upon IPO.
VC control rights are used to effect acquisitions.
Market conditions also significantly increase the likelihood of an IPO exit. IPOs are also more likely when there are a greater number of syndicated VC investors. This evidence supports related research. Gompers and Lerner (1999) show U.S. VCs are particularly skilled at timing the IPO market, and VC syndicates facilitate certification of entrepreneurial firm quality upon IPO (and possibly enable the VCs to collude and overstate entrepreneurial firm value upon exit). Table 11 indicates that write-offs occur after the shortest investment duration: bad information is revealed quickly (this is consistent with Cumming and MacIntosh, 2002) . The duration of investment does not impact upon the decision of an IPO versus an acquisition. Firms with the lowest market/book ratios obviously are written off, but there is no evidence that market/book differences affect the likelihood of an IPO or acquisition in this dataset. 16 When entrepreneurs control the exit decision, IPOs are more likely, and write-offs are less likely. Again, this is consistent with Black and Gilson's view that entrepreneurs prefer IPOs to regain control over the firm. It is also consistent with Petty et al.'s (1999) case studies on entrepreneur's attachment to their firms -their reluctance to sell the firm in an acquisition, and their reluctance to write-off their companies.
B. Determinants of IRR
Cochrane (2001, page 2) recognizes some distinguishing features of venture capital investing: poor liquidity, poor diversification, and information and monitoring. Gompers and Lerner (1999) the joint distribution function of the n returns of a portfolio is elliptical, then and only then the Markowitz-Sharpe mean-variance-ß can be used." It is noteworthy that t-distributions are elliptical, and normal distributions are spherical (a special case of an ellipsoid), but it is highly unlikely that the returns to venture capital are elliptical. The returns to venture capital are multimodal (MacIntosh, 1997; 1999; MacIntosh, 2002, 2003; Smith and Smith, 2000; Cochrane, 2001) : there is a high percentage (typically around 25% of all investments) of write-offs (-100% return), many investments generate a "good" annualized return of between 25-100%, and the lions-share of venture capital profits comes from a few very successful "homerun" investments with returns of more than 500%.
We therefore do not use a market model to explain returns. Most venture capital funds are not well diversified (the funds in this sample had between 2 and 20 investments in their portfolios); see also Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2001a,b) . The view taken here is that returns primarily depend on the characteristics of the investee and the nature of the contracts employed. [ Table 12 About Here] Table 12 indicates IPOs and acquisitions (naturally) give rise to higher returns (a dummy for write-offs was suppressed to avoid collinearity). The difference between the IPO and acquisition coefficient values was not statistically significant.
Higher VC ownership percentages also increased the IRRs to the VCs in the subsample of actual exits (Table 12) , and medical/biotech and Internet/communications industries had significantly higher IRRs in the sample.
The variable for market conditions in Table 12 is negative and significant, because market conditions sometimes gave rise to write-offs in this sample. Earlier stage investments also yielded lower IRRs, due to the write-offs in the sample from those investment stages.
The use of convertible preferred equity, and mixes of common equity and debt give rise to lower IRRs in this sample. Common equity, on the other hand, does not lower IRRs. The results are suggestive that simple financial structures 'work well'. Further empirical research is warranted.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The degrees of freedom do not permit inclusion of every specific contractual clause in the regressions in Table 11 and 12. Therefore, variables that aggregate the number of contingencies (subsection IV.D), veto rights (subsection IV.E), and control rights (subsection IV.F) are employed. IRRs were higher when VCs had a greater number of veto rights, but lower when contracts contained a greater number of control rights. Again, these results are suggestive of the value of particular clauses in VC contracts, but the limitations of the data (particularly the aggregation of clauses of similar type due to the limitation in degrees of freedom) give rise to a need for further research. As well, while we have used dummies for investor effects (or equivalently, country effects), further research on the impact of laws and institutions on contract structure and exit choice would be worthwhile (see also Black and Gilson, 1998) .
It is noteworthy that the VC funds in this dataset typically do not serve on boards of directors of entrepreneurial firms after 1 year of the exit date. (There were 2 exceptions for the IPO exits -one actual IPO and one expected IPO -and in the expected exit, it was the syndicated VC that was expected to remain on the board). Similarly, VC funds maintained an ownership interest in the entrepreneurial firm for more than one year after exit in only three exits (two of these cases overlapped with the two cases of VC board representation for more than 1 year after exit).
Three of the acquisition exits in this sample involved some exchange of shares (instead of complete payment in cash). Share consideration in acquisition exits is analogous to a partial acquisition (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2002) . The three cases were not materially different from the other acquisitions in this sample. Further research with additional European data would be worthwhile.
Finally, further research on the long-term performance of European VC IPO and acquisition exits depending on the role of the VC fund(s) pre-and post-exit, and on the nature of financial contracts between entrepreneurs and VCs and would be fruitful (see Gompers and Lerner, 1999 , for related U.S.-based VC research).
VII. CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence provided in this paper adds to the understanding of venture capital finance in two important respects. First, venture capital contracts for different types of entrepreneurial firms are functionally distinct. They can involve different securities (common equity, convertible preferred equity, mixes of debt and common, and mixes of preferred and common). They can also involve other specific contractual provisions pertaining to control rights, veto rights, board seats, etc. Each of these contractual provisions tends to be complementary, not substitutes. As such, different contracts are not functional equivalents.
Second, the use of different contracts -both the securities and specific contractual terms pertaining to cash flow and control rights -are important insofar as they play a role in determining the eventual exit vehicle selected, as well as the VC's IRR. Venture capital is nondiversified, value-added, active investing. Returns are a function of the types of entrepreneurial firms financed and the governance mechanisms used to oversee these firms.
The empirical evidence herein provides insight along these two dimensions. We hope that this evidence inspires further theoretical and empirical research so that we may better understand the financing process, and better evaluate the normative implications associated with different contracts and investments in different types of entrepreneurial firms. Common + Conv. Common + Conv. Common + Conv. Preferred This table presents, by type of security used, the number of portfolio investees involving covenants allowing future equity allocation to be contingent on measures of financial performance, non-financial performance, certain actions, and sale of shares. The party for which the contingent equity was directly granted is also reported. This table presents binomial logit estimates of the determinants of the selected security choice based on entrepreneurial firm characteristics, VC fund characteristics, the book value of the investment, whether the VC was lead investor, the number of syndicated partners, and the VC's board seats. *,**,*** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. NA: Not Applicable. Inclusion of variable caused perfect collinearity problems. 
# Contracts with contingencies on… # Contracts with contingencies for…
Unsolicited Offer
Non-Financial Contingencies -Entrepreneur
Explanatory Variables
Yes Yes Yes
Binomial Logit Model Dependent Variables
part 1). Determinants of Security Choice
This table presents multinomial logit estimates of the determinants of the selected security choice based on entrepreneurial firm characteristics, VC fund characteristics, the book value of the investment, whether the VC was lead investor, the number of syndicated partners, and the VC's board seats. *,**,*** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Log e (P Common /P ConvertiblePreferred )
Explanatory Variables
Log e (P Common /P MixedPred-Common ) L o g e (P Common /P MixedDebt-Pref-Common ) 
Predicted Outcomes
Table 5b (part 2). Determinants of Security Choice
Explanatory Variables Multinomial Logit Model Dependent Variables
Log e (P MixedPref-Common /P MixedDebt-Pref-Common ) Log e (P Convertible Preferred / P MixedDebt-Pref-Common ) Log e (P Convertible Preferred / P MixedPref-Common ) for bankruptcy, a proceeding that is worthwhile only when there are remaining assets to be divided up (Gilson and Schizer, 2002, footnote 21) . 8 See Cumming (2000) for evidence from Canada, Songtao (2000) for evidence from Taiwan, Smith and Parahangus (2000) for evidence from Finland, Bascha and Walz (2001) for evidence from Germany, as well as the Australian Bureau of Statistics. As well, note that U.S. VCs finance Canadian entrepreneurial firms with a variety of forms of finance (Cumming, 2001 ).
Unfortunately, direct tests of functional equivalence are not possible with any of these datasets.
For example, with a sample of Canadian venture capitalist data, Cumming (2000) provides tests of functional equivalence be grouping various securities together and considering whether groups of securities are used with the same intensity for similar transaction types. Cumming, however, cannot directly test for functional equivalence across securities with the underlying transactional terms.
